This is a book about everything. Literally. It is also a book about how anything whatsoever happens. By answering the question what is a thing?, philosopher M. Oreste Fiocco reveals what it is to exist, what a being, any being at all, is. In this way, he illuminates reality as a whole and what it is to be real. Such profound matters require a special method of inquiry, which Fiocco introduces and elaborates. Any assumption about the world or anything in (...) it might distort the correct answer to a question as general as what it is to exist. Thus, the method employed herein -- original inquiry -- begins with no assumptions about reality. It is, then, a method independent of any figure, trend, or tradition in the history of philosophy. Via this method, one simply confronts all this, the world, an all-encompassing diverse array of whatnot, and on this basis can come to a secure account of what it is to be. In simply confronting the world, however, one's experience shifts, is transient: all this goes from one way--with, say, a cat here--to some other way--the cat being over there. This manifest inconstancy must be accounted for in any comprehensive account of the world. Yet so must a manifest constancy. If the cat is now, at this moment, over there, that the cat is now, at this moment, over there is forever true. These seemingly contradictory phenomena, inconstancy and constancy, demonstrate the importance of time to understanding the world. Since any legitimate inquiry is directed at something or other and since many objects of inquiry (including inquiry itself) occur over time, correct accounts of temporal reality and of being - of time and the world - provide insight into all inquiry. These accounts provide constraints on and, hence, guidelines for investigating any subject matter in any field. Therefore, this is a book for anyone curious about such grand, abstruse matters as the nature of reality or of time itself, as well as a book for someone curious about any thing at all. (shrink)

To commemorate 40 years since the founding of the Journal of Business Ethics, the editors in chief of the journal have invited the editors to provide commentaries on the future of business ethics. This essay comprises a selection of commentaries aimed at creating dialogue around the theme Business versus Ethics?. The authors of these commentaries seek to transcend the age-old separation fallacy :409–421, 1994) that juxtaposes business and ethics/society, posing a forced choice or trade off. Providing a contemporary take on (...) the classical question “if it’s legal is it ethical?”, David Hess explores the role of the law in promoting or hindering stakeholder-oriented purpose and governance structure. Jeffrey Harrison encourages scholars to move beyond the presupposition that businesses are either strategic or ethical and explore important questions at the intersection of strategy and ethics. The proposition that business models might be inherently ethical or inherently unethical in their design is developed by Sheila Killian, who examines business systems, their morality, and who they serve. However, the conundrum that entrepreneurs are either lauded for their self-belief and risk-taking, or loathed for their self-belief and risk-taking, is discussed by M. Tina Dacin and Julia Roloff using the metaphor of taboos and totems. These commentaries seek to explore positions that advocate multiplicity and tensions in which business ethics is not either/or but both. (shrink)

Introduction non technique à la Théorie de l'Information Intégrée de la conscience de Giulio Tononi. Traduction française de l'article de Hedda Hassel Mørch.

What makes the words we speak mean what they do? Possible-worlds semantics articulates the view that the meanings of words contribute to determining, for each sentence, which possible worlds would make the sentence true, and which would make it false. M. J. Cresswell argues that the non-semantic facts on which such semantic facts supervene are facts about the causal interactions between the linguistic behaviour of speakers and the facts in the world that they are speaking about, and that the kind (...) of causation involved is best analysed using David Lewis's account of causation in terms of counterfactuals. Although philosophers have worked on the question of the connection between meaning and linguistic behaviour, it has mostly been without regard to the work done in possible-world semantics and Language in the World is a book-length examination of this problem. (shrink)

The idea that the mass m of an elementary particle is explained in the semi-classical approximation by quantum-mechanical zero-point vacuum fluctuations has been applied previously to spin-1/2 fermions to yield a real and positive constant value for m, expressed through the spinorial connection Γ i in the curved-space Dirac equation for the wave function ψ due to Fock. This conjecture is extended here to bosonic particles of spin 0 and spin 1, starting from the basic assumption that all fundamental fields (...) must be conformally invariant. As a result, in curved space-time there is an effective scalar mass-squared term $m_{0}^{2}=-R/6=2\varLambda_{\mathrm{b}}/3$ , where R is the Ricci scalar and Λ b is the cosmological constant, corresponding to the bosonic zero-point energy-density, which is positive, implying a real and positive constant value for m 0, through the positive-energy theorem. The Maxwell Lagrangian density $\mathcal{L} =- \sqrt{-g}F_{ij}F^{ij}/4$ for the Abelian vector field F ij ≡A j,i −A i,j is conformally invariant without modification, however, and the equation of motion for the four-vector potential A i contains no mass-like term in curved space. Therefore, according to our hypothesis, the free photon field A i must be massless, in agreement with both terrestrial experiment and the notion of gauge invariance. (shrink)

According to the ‘fact-plus-value’ model of pathology propounded by K. W. M. Fulford, ‘disease’ is a value term that ought to reflect a ‘balance of values’ stemming from patients and doctors and other ‘stakeholders’ in medical nosology. In the present article I take issue with his linguistic-analytical arguments for why pathological status must be relative to such a kind of medico-ethical normativity. Fulford is right to point out that Boorse and other naturalists are compelled to utilize evaluative terminology when they (...) characterize the nature of diseases and biological dysfunctions. But the relevant ‘biofunctional judgements’ are no less factual and empirical for that. While it is indeed evaluative to say that biological dysfunctions involve failures to execute naturally selected functions, such judgments are not bound to entail anything about what is good or bad for us, and what should be treated or not. In the last part of the paper I ruminate briefly on the relationship between ‘biological evaluationism’, on my construal, and descriptions of ‘causal biology’. As I note in my conclusion, a strict bioevaluative concept of disease can be valid for every species on earth, and thus be of particular usefulness in general biological contexts. (shrink)

Bilim felsefesinin en temel problemlerinden biri olan sınırlandırma problemi belirli bir ölçüt vasıtası ile bilimi, bilimsel olmayan ya da sahte/sözde bilim olan etkinliklerden ayırt edip edemeyeceğimizi konu edinmektedir. Literatüre baktığımızda felsefeciler –özellikle bilim felsefecileri– bilimin doğasını karakterize etme girişiminde bulunurken bilim dilinin mantıksal yapısına ya da bilimin tarihsel süreçlerine odaklanarak, bilimi bilimsel olmayan ya da sahte-bilim olan etkinliklerden ayırt etmişlerdir. Bu çalışma ise farklı bir yaklaşım benimseyerek sınırlandırma problemine, felsefecilerin değil, bilim insanlarının perspektifi ile bakmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu sebeple alanında deneyimli (...) ve çeşitli bilim dallarında profesör olan otuz bilim insanı ile niteliksel araştırma yöntemlerinden biri olan yapılandırılmış görüşme tekniği uygulanmıştır. Bu görüşmeler aracılığıyla bilim insanlarının sınırlandırma problemi hususunda öne sürdükleri görüşler açığa çıkartılıp değerlendirilmiştir. Değerlendirme neticesinde üç temel bulguya ulaşılmıştır. İlki, sınırlandırma problemine ilişkin sorularımıza bilim insanları tarafından getirilen yanıtların birçoğu temel felsefi yaklaşımlarla uyuşmaktadır. Elde ettiğimiz verileri farklı temalar altında analiz ettiğimiz bu çalışmada, sınırlandırma problemine dair yaygın felsefi görüşlerin, bilim insanlarının görüşleri ile anlamlı benzerlikler taşıdığı kısımlar vurgulanmıştır. İkincisi, sınırlandırma problemi ve bu problemlerle ilişkili diğer meseleler üzerinde felsefi olarak sağlanamayan uzlaşma, bilim insanları arasında da mevcuttur. Ne var ki bu ihtilaf dengeli bir biçimdedir, öyle ki benzer yanıtlara sahip olan bilim insanları baskın bir grup sayısına ulaşmamıştır. Üçüncü ve son olarak, bilim insanlarının bilim felsefesinin temel problemlerine yüksek oranda yabancı olduğu görülmektedir. Bu bulgu, her ne kadar nicel olmayan bir yolla ölçülmüşse de verilerin dikkatli analizi durumun bu yönde olduğunu göstermektedir. Tüm bu temel bulgular ışığında, genel değerlendirmemiz, farklı türden yapılandırılmış görüşmelerin çok daha detaylı sonuçlar temin edebileceğidir. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Sacramental Character and the Pattern of Theological Life:Medieval Context and Early Modern ReceptionReginald M. Lynch O.P.In question 63 of the tertia pars, Thomas Aquinas defines the so-called character that is conferred by certain sacraments (namely baptism, confirmation, and holy orders), as a secondary effect caused by the sacraments, with grace itself identified as the primary effect. As separated instruments of the humanity of Christ, in his mature work in (...) the Summa theologiae Aquinas argues that all Christian sacraments are perfective instrumental causes of the effect of the Incarnation in the human persons who receive them.1 As instrumental means by which these effects are conferred, therefore, for Aquinas the sapiential intelligibility of the sacraments is found in the larger sweep of sacra doctrina and the Incarnation, wherein the ratio and necessity of these larger theological themes contextualize Aquinas's understanding of the necessity of the sacraments themselves as instrumental extensions of the same.2 Taken in itself, aspects of what would later become the question of sacramental character for Scholastics first emerged as a doctrinal topic in the context of patristic debates over the permanence of the sacrament of baptism.3 In the Latin West, the influence of Augustine's distinction between the permanence of the sacramentum received in baptism and its use in charity proved to be a ubiquitous influence [End Page 1337] for later Latin theology.4 Concerning the metaphysical nature of this character, however, in both his Sentences commentary and Summa theologiae, Aquinas joins an ongoing conversation among thirteenth-century Scholastics about the utility of the Aristotelian categories for describing sacramental character. What is sacramental character specifically, and how should this be understood in relation to the wider speculative complexities of grace, the infused virtues and gifts, and beatitude? Because of continued controversy over the role of Aristotelianism in theology during the second half of the thirteenth century, many Scholastics of Aquinas's generation analyzed the quiddity of sacramental character from an Aristotelian perspective, working to describe the doctrine inherited from the Church's tradition using Aristotelian terminology. As will be shown, although some argued that sacramental character should be understood as a habitus, Aquinas argues that character is better understood as a power.The second and third sections of this article will explore the development of Scholastic accounts of the quiddity of sacramental character during the medieval and early modern periods, and the wider theological implications of these conversations. In the final analysis, it is my aim to show not only that Aquinas's account of sacramental character is intrinsically fitting on theological grounds, but that Aquinas's account of sacramental character as a qualitative power conveys and preserves the received theological tradition more effectively than the options proposed by some of his contemporaries. With these larger objectives in mind, the first section of this article serves as a necessary historical prelude—what, precisely, is at stake from the wider perspective of the Church's theological tradition in these medieval and early modern Scholastic debates? Accordingly, the first section will provide an overview of the historical development of the doctrine of sacramental character, focusing specifically on the way in which certain Augustinian doctrinal concepts and linguistic usages developed in later medieval usage and ultimately came to be incorporated into the framework of Peter Lombard's Sentences—the text that would serve as the common backdrop for the Scholastic conversations about the "quiddity" of this same doctrine.In the following, therefore, this article will begin by examining the origins of the doctrine of sacramental character in Latin theology in Augustine's baptismal theology. Building on this foundation, our attention will turn to Peter Lombard's reception of Augustine's as the context in which [End Page 1338] thirteenth-century Scholastic debates about sacramental character would develop. Although the specific metaphysical questions that Scholastics like Aquinas and Bonaventure would entertain do not form part of Augustine's approach to this issue, Lombard's particular articulation of Augustine's sacramental theology would provide the textual and conceptual backdrop against which these later Scholastic conversations would develop. Accordingly, the second section of this article will build on the first, beginning with a consideration of Aquinas... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:One Body: An Essay in Christian Sexual Ethics by Alexander R. PrussBenedict M. Guevin O.S.B.One Body: An Essay in Christian Sexual Ethics. By Alexander R. Pruss. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013. Pp. ix + 465. $45.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-268-03897-7.As a professor of moral theology in general and of sexual ethics in particular, I found Alexander Pruss’s largely philosophical account of sexual ethics to be (...) refreshing. As much as I try to dissuade my students from using religious legalism to justify the rightness or wrongness of certain sexual practices, I find it almost impossible to break them of the bad habit of using such phrases as “Because the Church teaches...” or “Because the Bible says...”. Even when I counter by saying, “The Church teaches that something is good because it is good and not because the Church says it is good, and such goodness is grounded in the natural law and a sound anthropology,” such legalism still persists. And so, to read Pruss’s extensive analysis of sexual ethics using both personalist and Thomistic principles as well as what we have received from divine revelation is a much-needed tonic not only for students of theology and philosophy but for all those interested in discovering the role of human reason and biology in crafting a sexual ethic.After an introduction, the proper beginning of Pruss’s analysis is found in chapter 2. Here, the author discusses love and its forms with a particular focus on the meaning of agapē in the New Testament. Pruss argues that, philosophically speaking, we should love everyone. But love should not be understood as monolithic. There are various kinds of love: agapē, philia, and erōs. The New Testament understanding of agapē contains the other two, for it is love itself. This kind of love is a love that loves the other as the other is, for the other’s sake, and in a way that is appropriate to that person in the light of objective facts. Moreover, this kind of love is not simply a feeling or an emotion but is concentrated in an action that is an expression of one’s will.In chapter 3, Pruss takes up the issue of desire. He evaluates desire in two ways: (1) desire and libido, and (2) sexual desire, need, and pleasure. He [End Page 485] concludes that sexual desire is not a need in the same way that we desire food, drink, communication, love, and to be loved. Without these latter, human life would be seriously lacking or, in the case of food and drink, quickly cut short. Second, he observes that circumstances may not be appropriate for fulfilling one’s sexual desire. Finally, while human life would be seriously compromised by the lack of food, drink, communication, love, and the need to be loved, abstaining from the fulfillment of sexual desire even over a long period of time would not be detrimental to human well-being in the same way.Pruss does not imply by the preceding that sexuality does not matter. Chapter 4, in fact, deals with the meaningfulness of sexuality. There are two sets of rules regarding sexuality and its expression. Some rules are moral in nature, like the prohibition against rape. Other rules are customs, for example, the exchanging of rings after the exchange of marital vows. With respect to the moral rules regarding sexuality, Pruss highlights casual sex, sexual assault, gay rights, and romantic love. Apart from sexual assault and rape—both of which lack consent—casual sex, homosexual sex, and romantic love have the following in common, namely, that sex is indeed innately important to human beings and that sex aspires to be romantic in nature. While, as in the case of casual sex, romantic love does not necessarily give rise to true love, romantic love is often the prelude to a deep and unique form of love. Why this is so has to do with the meaning of sexual union.Sexual union is the topic of chapter 5, presented under the title “One Flesh, One Body.” Scripture, Pruss affirms, describes the person as... (shrink)

An axiomatic framework for describing general space-time models is presented. Space-time models to which irreducible propositional systems belong as causal logics are quantum (q) theoretically interpretable and their event spaces are Hilbert spaces. Such aq space-time is proposed via a “canonical” quantization. As a basic assumption, the time t and the radial coordinate r of aq particle satisfy the canonical commutation relation [t,r]=±i $h =$ . The two cases will be considered simultaneously. In that case the event space is the (...) Hilbert space L2(ℝ3). Unitary symmetries consist of Poincaré-like symmetries (translations, rotations, and inversion) and of gauge-like symmetries. Space inversion implies time inversion. Thisq space-time reveals a confinement phenomenon: Theq particle is “confined” in an $h =$ size region of Minkowski space $\mathbb{M}^4$ at any time. One particle mechanics overq space-time provides mass eigenvalue equations for elementary particles. Prugovečki's stochasticq mechanics andq space-time offer a natural way for introducing and interpreting consistently such aq space-time andq particles existing in it. The mass eigenstates ofq particles generate Prugovečki's extended elementary particles. When $h =$ →0, these particles shrink to point particles and $\mathbb{M}^4$ is recovered as the classical (c) limit ofq space-time. Conceptual considerations favor the case [t,r]=+i $h =$ , and applications in hadron physics give the fit $h =$ ⋍2/5 fermi/GeV. (shrink)

The Schrödinger equation for a particle of rest mass $m$ and electrical charge $ne$ interacting with a four-vector potential $A_i$ can be derived as the non-relativistic limit of the Klein–Gordon equation $\left( \Box '+m^2\right) \varPsi =0$ for the wave function $\varPsi $ , where $\Box '=\eta ^{jk}\partial '_j\partial '_k$ and $\partial '_j=\partial _j -\mathrm {i}n e A_j$ , or equivalently from the one-dimensional action $S_1=-\int m ds +\int neA_i dx^i$ for the corresponding point particle in the semi-classical approximation $\varPsi \sim (...) \exp {(\mathrm {i}S_1)}$ , both methods yielding the equation $\mathrm {i}\partial _0\varPsi \approx \left( \frac{1}{2m}\eta ^{\alpha \beta }\partial '_{\alpha }\partial '_{\beta } + m + n e\phi \right) \varPsi $ in Minkowski space–time , where $\alpha ,\beta =1,2,3$ and $\phi =-A_0$ . We show that these two methods generally yield equations that differ in a curved background space–time $g_{ij}$ , although they coincide when $g_{0\alpha }=0$ if $m$ is replaced by the effective mass $\mathcal{M}\equiv \sqrt{m^2-\xi R}$ in both the Klein–Gordon action $S$ and $S_1$ , allowing for non-minimal coupling to the gravitational field, where $R$ is the Ricci scalar and $\xi $ is a constant. In this case $\mathrm {i}\partial _0\varPsi \approx \left( \frac{1}{2\mathcal{M}'} g^{\alpha \beta }\partial '_{\alpha }\partial '_{\beta } + \mathcal{M}\phi ^{(\mathrm g)} + n e\phi \right) \varPsi $ , where $\phi ^{(\mathrm g)} =\sqrt{g_{00}}$ and $\mathcal{M}'=\mathcal{M}/\phi ^{(\mathrm g)} $ , the correctness of the gravitational contribution to the potential having been verified to linear order $m\phi ^{(\mathrm g)} $ in the thermal-neutron beam interferometry experiment due to Colella et al. Setting $n=2$ and regarding $\varPsi $ as the quasi-particle wave function, or order parameter, we obtain the generalization of the fundamental macroscopic Ginzburg-Landau equation of superconductivity to curved space–time. Conservation of probability and electrical current requires both electromagnetic gauge and space–time coordinate conditions to be imposed, which exemplifies the gravito-electromagnetic analogy, particularly in the stationary case, when div ${{\varvec{A}}}=\hbox {div}{{\varvec{A}}}^{(\mathrm g)}=0$ , where ${{\varvec{A}}}^{\alpha }=-A^{\alpha }$ and ${{\varvec{A}}}^{(\mathrm g)\alpha }=-\phi ^{(\mathrm g)}g^{0\alpha }$ . The quantum-cosmological Schrödinger (Wheeler–DeWitt) equation is also discussed in the $\mathcal{D}$ -dimensional mini-superspace idealization, with particular regard to the vacuum potential $\mathcal V$ and the characteristics of the ground state, assuming a gravitational Lagrangian $L_\mathcal{D}$ which contains higher-derivative terms up to order $\mathcal{R}^4$ . For the heterotic superstring theory , $L_\mathcal{D}$ consists of an infinite series in $\alpha '\mathcal{R}$ , where $\alpha '$ is the Regge slope parameter, and in the perturbative approximation $\alpha '|\mathcal{R}| \ll 1$ , $\mathcal V$ is positive semi-definite for $\mathcal{D} \ge 4$ . The maximally symmetric ground state satisfying the field equations is Minkowski space for $3\le {\mathcal {D}}\le 7$ and anti-de Sitter space for $8 \le \mathcal {D} \le 10$. (shrink)

Çin, son dönemlerde Körfez Bölgesine yönelik izlediği aktif politika, Çin Devlet Başkanı Xi Jipping’in (Şi Cinping), 7-9 Aralık 2022 tarihinde Körfez’e gerçekleştirdiği kapsamlı ziyaretle birlikte daha fazla dinamizm kazanmıştır. Bu ziyareti takiben yapılan analizler Çin’in, Körfez açılımını ABD’nin bölgesel hegemonyasını zayıflatmaya yönelik bir girişim olarak değerlendirmektedirler. Aynı ziyaret sırasında Pekin ve Riyad yönetimleri arasında imzalanan kapsamlı anlaşmalar ise ABD’nin Körfezdeki uzun erimli güvenlik partneri Suudi Arabistan’a ilişkin “eksen kayması” tartışmalarını başlattı. Bu çalışma güncelliğini koruyan iki tartışmanın kapsamlı bir muhakemesini yapmayı (...) hedeflemektedir. Bu amaçla uluslararası ilişkiler disiplinin son dönem fenomen teorisi olan hiyerarşinin ilgili argümanları kullanılmaktadır. Bu teorik çerçeveden hareketle, çalışmada ilk olarak Çin’in Körfez siyasetini şekillendiren stratejilerin fiyat arttırma (oubidding) ve negatif dengeleme (negative balancing) olduğu ve bu stratejilerin Körfez Bölgesi ülkeleri açısından yeni imkânlar yarattığı tespitinde bulunulmaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra Suudi Arabistan’ın, Çin ile gelişen ikili ilişkilerini hâlihazırda ABD ile sürdürmekte olduğu ilişkisine bir alternatif olarak görmediği, aksine Çin’in bahsi geçen stratejilerinden maksimum kazanım elde ederek otonomisini arttırmaya çalıştığı ayrıca belirtiliyor. (shrink)

In retrospect, I think I was right to compose Natural Supernaturalism by relying on taste, tact, and intuition rather than on a controlling method. A book of this kind, which deals with the history of human intellection, feeling, and imagination, employs special vocabularies, procedures, and modes of demonstration which, over many centuries of development, have shown their profitability when applied to matters of this sort. I agree with Booth that these procedures, when valid, are in a broad sense rational, and (...) subject to analysis and some degree of definition. But the rules underlying such a discourse are complex, elusive, unsystematic, and subject to innovative modification; they manifest themselves in the intuitive expertise of the historian; and the specification of these rules should not precede, but follow practice. . . . After the fact, nevertheless, a book like Natural Supernaturalism is subject to close critical inquiry about its methods and rationale. I am grateful to Booth for opening up such an inquiry, and for doing so in a way that is not only disarming, but seems to me to be the most promising of useful results. That is, instead of adopting a prosecutorial stance, demanding: "Justify the rationality and probative force of what you have done; it looks dammed suspicious to me," he has adopted the friendly tactic of saying: "Your book, in my experience of it, has yielded discoveries that I want to call knowledge, by methods, however deviant from standard rubrics of valid reasoning, that it seems irrational to call non-rational. Let's set out to clarify what these methods are, and to see what grounds we can find for the claim that they provide warranted knowledge." M.H. Abrams' contributions to Critical Inquiry are "The Deconstructive Angel" and "Behaviorism and Deconstruction: A Comment on Morse Peckham's 'The Infinitude of Pluralism'". (shrink)

Juan B. Justo en la historia y el pensamiento argentinos, por A. Solari.--Teoría y práctica de la historia, por M. H. Alberti.--La base biológica de la historia, por F. Escardó.--La técnica, por A. Justo.--La economía, por R. Bogliolo.--La guerra, por A. G. Rodríguez.--La política, por A. Ghioldi.--La lucha de ciases, por R. Mondolfo.--El salariado, por M. Palacín.--Las formas típicas del privilegio, por J. L. Pena.--El gremialismo proletario, por E. Frugoni.--La cooperación libre, por N. Repetto.--La democracia obrera, por L. Pan.--La religión, (...) la cilencia, el arte, por R. Rivière. (shrink)

We study the minimal enumeration degree problem in models of fragments of Peano arithmetic () and prove the following results: in any model M of Σ2 induction, there is a minimal enumeration degree if and only if M is a nonstandard model. Furthermore, any cut in such a model has minimal e-degree. By contrast, this phenomenon fails in the absence of Σ2 induction. In fact, whether every Σ2 cut has minimal e-degree is independent of the Σ2 bounding principle.

Historically the emergence of a precise technical meaning for probability, as distinct from its vague popular useage, has taken time; and confusion still arises from the concept of probability having different meanings in different flelds of discourse. Its technical meaning and appropriate rules are surveyed in the flelds of logic , mathematics , and science , and the relation between these three aspects of probability theory discussed. ‐. M. S. B.

Let κ be a regular cardinal, and let B be a subalgebra of an interval algebra of size κ. The existence of a chain or an antichain of size κ in B is due to M. Rubin (see [7]). We show that if the density of B is countable, then the same conclusion holds without this assumption on κ. Next we also show that this is the best possible result by showing that it is consistent with 2 ℵ 0 = (...) ℵ ω 1 that there is a boolean algebra B of size ℵ ω 1 such that length(B) = ℵ ω 1 is not attained and the incomparability of B is less than ℵ ω 1 . Notice that B is a subalgebra of an interval algebra. For more on chains and antichains in boolean algebras see, e.g. [1] and [2]. (shrink)

The new historical inscription from Epidaurus has provided us with a unique piece of documentary evidence on Greek federal constitutions. In this article I propose to study the principal points of constitutional interest contained in it. I have based my text on that of Professor Wilcken and M. Kougeas; and I follow Professor Wilcken and Mr. Tarn in identifying the new document with the constitution which Demetrius Poliorcetes imposed upon his pan-Hellenic League in 303–2 B.C.

In this note we sketch a decision procedure for S3.51 based on reduction to conjunctive normal form. Using the following theorem of S3.5: and its dual for M over a conjunction, any formula can be reduced by standard methods (as in S52) to a conjunction of disjunctions of the form where Í is (p ⊃ p), 0 is ∼(p ⊃ p) and α — λ are all PC-wffs (i.e. they contain no modal operators).

This year is the seventieth since the birth of the distinguished Soviet philosopher, M. A. Dynnik. Dynnik is known for his work in the history of philosophy, the history of dialectics, and the critique of contemporary bourgeois philosophy. Dynnik's works are a significant contribution to Marxist philosophy, and to the methodology of research into so important a field as the history of philosophy. Dynnik is also known as a remarkable teacher, whose brilliant lectures are always heard with immense interest.

“You Have Seen Their Faces”: Gisèle Freund, Walter Benjamin and Margaret Bourke-White as Headhunters of the Thirties -/- Abstract This paper concentrates on one work by each of three authors: Walter Benjamin’s Deutsche Menschen (Germans), an anthology of twenty-five 18th and 19th century German personal letters; Margaret Bourke-White and Erskine Caldwell’s You Have Seen Their Faces; and Gisèle Freund’s collection of photographic portraits of writers and artists, compiled between 1936 and 1939. The purpose of this paper is to compare the (...) politics of representation of these three figures and to examine the challenge they addressed to the dominant iconography of the 1930s. At the heart of each one’s work was a desire to bring about a shift in contemporary cultural politics by reimagining the body politic. Benjamin’s and Freund’s aim was to displace the monumentalizing, distancing, ‘heroic’ forms of fascist art and writing. They construct and project an intimate, or ‘domestic’ image of humanism as a form of social practice, past and present. Bourke-White’s aim was to bring to visibility an America concealed beneath the glossy homogenized images of white American advertising. All three authors aligned themselves with a documentary tradition that believed that representation should function as a constructed record of the traces of lived experience. Driven by a need to expose the other side’s deliberate falsifications of experience, they saw their own constructed fictions as ways of ‘documenting,’ and then perhaps transforming, an experiential world of ‘facts,’ bodies, and ‘truths.’ -/- Working Paper 3:15 European Society and Culture Research Group. Center for German and European Studies, University of California at Berkeley. April 1994 37pp. -/- M. Kay Flavell Critical Theory, University of California at Davis . (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:TOWARD A THOMISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON ABORTION AND THE LAW IN CONTE:MPORARY AMERICA M. CATHLEEN KAVENY Yale University New Haven, Oonnecticut Introduction W;HEN THE SUPREME COURT handed down its abortion decision Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1 in the summer of 1989, it was widely prel 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). All further citations to Webster will be given parenthetically in the text. To summarize the most significant aspects. of (...) the decision: A. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored an opinion of the Oourt (of the highest precedential value) which was joined by Justices White, Kennedy, Scalia, and O'Connor. The majority found the lower courts to be in error in striking down as unconstitutional the preamble to a Missouri statute which asserted that "the life -0f each human being begins at conception." The opinion of the Court also found that Missouri could constitutionally prohibit the use of public employees and facilities in the performance of abortions not necessary to save the mother's life. B. The Court also upheld the Missouri statute's provision requiring a. doctor to perform viability tests before aborting a fetus the doctor believes is of 20 or more weeks gestational age. In the plurality opinion (of less precedential value than an opinion -0f the Court, since it is not joined by a majority of the justices), Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Kennedy argued that since most fetuses are not viable at twenty weeks, the provision would impose substantial restrictions unrelated to the health of the mother upon what are, in fact, simply sec-0nd trimester abortions. Because they believed such restrictions to be in tension with Roe's trimester system, the plurality decided to abandon that system, along with its stipulation that the state's interest in unborn life became compelling only at viability. The plurality contended, however, that Webster presented no occasion for reconsidering Roe's holding, which deemed unconstitutional a statute prohibiting all abortions except those necessary to save the life of the mother. In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia went further, arguing that the Court should explicitly overrule Roe v. Wade. On the other hand, Justice O'Connor, 848 344 M. CAT'HLEEN KAVENY dieted that this would exaicerbate a dangerously bitter social·struggle. In its 1973 decision Roe v. Wade (410 U.S. 113), the court had e1abo:raJted.a woman's right to abortion, and, in rthe sixteen years that fo11owed it, it ga,V'e that right unwavering support. Webster 'seemed to mark a retl.'eat from that support. The new scope it offered for state regulation of rubortion promised rto ignite gra,ss-roots forvor and a stiate..:by-state battle between those seeking rto maintain the abortion rights est1ab1isihed by Roe and its sequalia and those st:dving to limit the s1oope of these rights in 1 significant ways. Much of the criticism of Webster has fooused narrowly upon how weM the,decision has aiocorided with various views on the morality of abortion. Yet important 1as this issue is, thorough ethicaJ ana:lysis of Webster must address severa1l additional fac~ tors. The ethiicatl aidequacy of positive law, induding judicial interpretations of faw siuch as Webster, must he ev1alruated in terms of whetheir it aidvanices or impedes the common good. The common good requires not only that we consider the moml substance of legal requirements but tha:t we ailso attend to the manner in which law is made, promulgated, ml!d interpreted. Such an analysis is,sorely needed; it should. specify the severa1l factors involved in determining whether any given legal also concurring in the plurality's judgment, maintained that this provision of the statute could be upheld without any reconsideration of Roe, since it co· hered with that decision's recognition of the compelling state interest in viable fetal life. C. Justice Blackmun authored an opinion dissenting from the majority on the issues discussed above, and he was joined by Justices Brennan and Mar· shall. The thrust of his opposition is directed against the plurality's treatment of the viability testing,provisions. Blackmun first suggested that i.f understood according to the canons of proper statutory interpretation, these provisions unconstitutionally restrict the attending physician... (shrink)

t. 1. A-D -- t. 2. E-M -- t. 3. N-S -- t.4. T-I︠A︡.

In the Classical Quarterly, XIX., pp. 192–3, in some remarks on the word celtis, I suggested that the Philoxenus gloss CE 23 was in reality a fusion of two glosses— Celtis : ȋνα Celtis : ίΧθύος εδος and I tried to show that the former was a Bible gloss from Job xix. 24. Since the appearance of my article it has been pointed out by Professor Housman, in a communication to Professor W. M. Lindsay, that I had overlooked the kindred (...) Philoxenus gloss SQ 4 ; and it would appear that, in view of this regrettable oversight, the division of the gloss CE 23 and the explanation of the first part as a Bible gloss is untenable. (shrink)

In a recent article1 mention was made of a MS. from which Goetz printed selections in Vol. V. of the . This MS. was not used by Goetz. On fol. 81 appears the following entry: ‘Moechus est adulter alterius t[h]orum furtim polluens; inde a m echo dicitur m[o]echanica ars, ingeniosa atque subtilissima et p ene quomodo facta uel administrata sit inuisibilis in tantum, ut etiam uisum conspicientium quodam modo furetur, dum non facile penetratur eius ingeniositas quali ingenio artis candelabrum illud (...) Theodosianum factum legitur.’. (shrink)

If T has only countably many complete types, yet has a type of infinite multiplicity then there is a c.c.c. forcing notion Q such that, in any Q-generic extension of the universe, there are non-isomorphic models M 1 and M 2 of T that can be forced isomorphic by a c.c.c. forcing. We give examples showing that the hypothesis on the number of complete types is necessary and what happens if `c.c.c.' is replaced by other cardinal-preserving adjectives. We also give (...) an example showing that membership in a pseudo-elementary class can be altered by very simple cardinal-preserving forcings. (shrink)

The great Franciscan theologian St. Bonaventure engaged in philosophy as well as theology, and the relation between the two in Bonaventure's work has long been debated. Yet, few studies have been devoted to Bonaventure's thought as a whole. In this survey, Christopher M. Cullen reveals Bonaventure as a great synthesizer, whose system of thought bridged the gap between theology and philosophy. The book is organized according to the categories of Bonaventure's own classic text, De reductione artium ad theologiam. Cullen follows (...) Bonaventure's own division of the branches of philosophy and theology, analyzing them as separate but related entities. He shows that Bonaventure was a scholastic, whose mysticism was grounded in systematic theological and philosophical reasoning. He presents a fresh and nuanced perspective on Bonaventure's debt to Augustine, while clarifying Aristotle's influence. Cullen also puts Bonaventure's ideas in context of his time and place, contributing significantly to our understanding of the medieval world. This accessible introduction provides a much-needed overview of Bonaventure's thought. Cullen offers a clear and rare reading of "Bonaventurianism" in and for itself, without the complications of critique and comparison. This book promises to become a standard text on Bonaventure, useful for students and scholars of philosophy, theology, medieval studies, and the history of Christianity. (shrink)

Was there a second legion in Palestine at all ? Mommsen has raised a doubt. In his note on C.I.L. iii 6641 ‘M. Iunio Maximo Leg. Augg. Leg. X Fr….’ he says ‘Quo tempore titulus positus est provinciam Palaestinam una sola legio obtinuerit necesse est X Fretensis; nam Augustorum vocabulum legatis legionis non solet addi nisi simul provinciae praesunt. Legio VI Ferrata quamquam a Dione in Iudaea collocatur, vide ne castra habuerit in Batanaea quae fuit sub legato Syriae Phoenices.’ On (...) C.I.L. iii 6703 similarly he says ‘legatus legionis Augusti vocabulum raro adsumit’ But the title ‘leg. Aug.’ does seem to be used with sufficient frequency of a simple ‘legatus legionis’ to invalidate Mommsen's argument: e.g. Dessau 1026 ‘leg. Aug. leg. xi C. p. f.’; 1036, 1055, 1070, 1141 etc: and the soldiers of Capitolias might just as easily have served across the border in Palestine. Zangemeister, who first published the inscription of Iunius Maximus {Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins x 1887, 49–53) took the same view as Mommsen, that he was the provincial legatus; but later he admitted that in that case the words ‘pro praetore’ would have been added. (shrink)

In a little over two hundred years, American legal thought moved from premodernism through modernism and into postmodernism. This book charts that intellectual voyage, stressing both the historical contexts in which ideas unfolded and the inherent force of the ideas themselves.Author Stephen M. Feldman first defines "premodernism," "modernism," and "postmodernism," then explains the development of American legal thought through these three intellectual periods. His narrative revolves around two broad, interrelated themes: jurisprudential foundations and the notion of progress. He points out (...) that much of American legal thought has grappled with the problem of identifying the foundations of the American judicial system and judicial decision making. The various ideas of jurisprudential foundations, moreover, are closely tied to shifting notions of progress-the definition of the term, assumptions about the possibility of progress, and hopes about how law might contribute to it.This book's broad historical sweep and its clear explanations of the competing theoretical positions of current legal scholarship make it indispensable to students and scholars of jurisprudence and American legal history. (shrink)

Originally published in 1939, this volume contains the text of an inaugural lecture delivered by M. M. Postan on his accession to the Professorship of Economic History at the University of Cambridge. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in economic history or the history of the study of humanities.

Philosophie et sciences: voila un theme difficile, central, de notre temps, ou il est necessairement question de son sens. C'est ce sens qu'interrogent, d'une facon a la fois historique et problematique, les essais du present volume. J. Merleau-Ponty questionne les rapports entre sciences et vulgarisation scientifique. J. Ladriere pose le probleme de La normativite de la pensee scientifique. J. Lambert met en evidence le probleme du Livre de la Nature chez Galilee et Kepler. P. Kerszberg confronte les structures internes de (...) la philosophie critique kantienne et de la theorie de la relativite sur la question cosmologique. M. Richir analyse L'illusion transcendantale dans la theorie cantorienne des ensembles. B. d'Espagnat et G. Hottois evoquent le problemes des rapports difficiles, aujourd'hui, entre science et philosophie. (shrink)

In his report to the Twenty-seventh Congress of the CPSU, M.S. Gorbachev noted that "our philosophical and economic front, indeed the social sciences in general, find themselves in a state … somewhat removed from the demands of life."1 He further pointed out that "the times demand that the social sciences address the concrete needs of practical activity on a broad front, that social scientists respond keenly and deftly to the changes taking place in life, that they not lose sight of (...) new phenomena and draw conclusions capable of truly guiding practical activity". (shrink)

This paper builds on previous work by Sirgy, M. J., Journal of Business Ethics 19, 193–206, dealing with issues of code of conduct of marketing educators. Sirgy developed a discussion document outlining a semblance of what might be construed as a code of ethics for marketing educators. The discussion document was debated and accompanied by three commentaries. One conclusion derived from the discussion document and the commentaries is the need to develop a code of ethics involving behaviors that most marketing (...) educators find morally unacceptable. The current paper reports on a descriptive study involving a survey of marketing educators in which survey respondents were asked to rate the extent to which certain behaviors are deemed acceptable or unacceptable. The results of the survey identified certain behaviors deemed unacceptable by the vast majority of survey respondents. This evidence of hypernorms within the community of marketing educators was used to propose an initial code of ethics. (shrink)

‘A is a better X than B’ is to mean the same as ‘If one is choosing an X, then, if one chooses B, one ought to choose A’ (R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 184).

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Classics and Complexity in Walden’s “Spring” M. D. USHER In 1843, two years before Henry Thoreau built his cabin at Walden Pond, the Fitchburg Railroad laid down tracks through the woods near the Pond for its line connecting Boston to Fitchburg. The original Fitchburg Line, at 54 miles long, was, until 2010, the longest run in the present -day MBTA Commuter Rail system. And it is one of (...) the oldest railways in New England. By 1900, fortunes swelled and the Fitchburg’s Hoosac Tunnel Line took passengers and goods westward toward Chicago. The Lake Champlain Route connected Boston to points north like Burlington, Vermont. (See Figure 1.) arion 27.1 spring/summer 2019 Figure 1 (left): Advertisement for the Hoosac Tunnel Route in The New England Magazine (Vol. 21, Issue 6, February, 1900). Figure 2 (right): Herbert Wendell Gleason. The Fitchburg Railroad and Walden Pond in winter, Concord, Mass., March 24, 1920. Courtesy Concord Free Public Library. The Railroad was literally a fixture in Thoreau’s landscape. Its tracks pass remarkably close to Walden Pond (Figure 2), and the Fitchburg Line—both its reality and the specter of it—is practically a character in his writing: “I usually go to the village along its causeway, and am, as it were, related to society by this link,” Thoreau writes in “Sounds,” a chapter of Walden that contains what must be one of the most picturesque odes (or laments) to rail travel and commerce in all of American literature: The engine’s whistle, Thoreau complains, pierces the still silence of his idyllic retreat like a screaming hawk circling a farmer’s field, its billows of steam an ominous harbinger of “this travelling demi-god, this cloud-compeller.”1 Thoreau’s frequent, customary walks into Concord along the railroad tracks took him through a heavily excavated stretch of the line known as the Deep Cut, to which he returned again and again each year in early spring, even after leaving the cabin, to observe and to record his observations. The leaf-shaped sand flows and trickling surface erosion caused by melting frost in the banks of the Deep Cut are elaborately described in Thoreau’s chapter in Walden entitled “Spring,” what Laurence Buell calls the “high point of Thoreau’s epic.”2 And yet, in spite of the universal acclaim of this passage as a literary tour de force, it has not received the full attention it deserves. What warrants fresh consideration first and foremost is “Spring”’s deep-rootedness in classical sources. Many classical influences, allusions, and a good deal of etymological word play have gone so far unnoticed. The chapter is also important because it describes, by intimation, what contemporary scientists now call emergence. Emergent phenomena are properties or behaviors that arise in systems as a result of complex, dynamic interactions amongst constituent parts, including changes to a system brought about by human interventions3—not only, e.g., climate change and wildfires, but also traffic patterns and terrorist networks; kidney function in the body; the rings of Saturn. As he tries to capture the essence of the 114 classics and complexity in WALDEN’s “spring” Deep Cut and interpret its significance, Thoreau adumbrates this concept, but also grapples ingeniously with broader issues of perennial concern—the relationship of Nature to Culture, for example, of Wilderness to Civilization, of Science to the Humanities—making “Spring” not only a probing work of eco-criticism and environmental philosophy, but of scientific reflection and poetic experiment as well. In short, Thoreau’s “Spring” is that rare work of classical reception that transmits both literary and scientific insight. Perhaps at this point, in lieu of accolades, it is best to let Thoreau start speaking for himself. What I offer in the following pages is a commentary on the Deep Cut passage from “Spring.” Classical references and aspects of systems theory will be explained and contextualized as they emerge, as it were, from Thoreau’s text. The whole chapter corresponds to pages 289–308 in Cramer’s edition of Walden—26 paragraphs all told, of which only the relevant ones are printed and annotated here. (Transitions and extraneous material are briefly summarized, as needed, in paraphrase... (shrink)

Books reviewed: The Literary Wittgenstein edited by John Gibson and Wolfgang Huerner, Routledge, London, 2004 (pp. xi + 356). Philosophy and Literature: A Book of Essays, M. W. Rowe, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004 (pp xii + 238). Reviewed by M. H. Weston, University of Essex University of Essex Wivenhoe Park Colchester CO4 3SQ.

J. Solomon [Journal de Physique 4, 34 (1933)] produced an argument of great generality claiming to demonstrate the impossibility of hidden variables in quantum theory, an argument which M. Jammer [The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics(Wiley, New York, 1974)] said raised a number of questions. For the first time, this argument is discussed, a simple hidden variable model violating the argument is analysed in detail, and the error in the proof is located.

An excellent introduction to communication theory, this book is a comprehensive study of its subject; fields such as linguistics, logic, mathematics, and psychology are considered in terms of their relevance for communication theory. No material that appeared in the first edition has been deleted from this second edition, but some comments have been added, some figures updated, and the bibliography extended to include the new publications in the field. Cherry begins with an examination of the concept of "communication"; he also (...) discusses social structures, considering the pattern of communication within a social group. After this introductory chapter, Cherry presents an historical review of the evolution of communication theory; he discusses codes, signs, brains, and machines, mentioning the work of such scientists as Shannon, Zipf, and Wiener. Topics such as phonetics, phonemics, object language and metalanguage, Zipf's Law, and semantics are also considered, as well as the role of the telecommunication engineer, who describes and analyzes the physical signals themselves without reference to their meanings. In the concluding chapter, psychological considerations concerning the reception of information are presented: recognition, for example, of universals, of geometric figures, of speech sounds, of distorted speech, the relevance of past experience, and the intake of information by the senses. Although technical material is presented, the book is very readable; jargon is kept at a minimum. The result is an exceedingly interesting and stimulating book.—E. M. (shrink)

McNeilly presents an interesting if not altogether convincing analysis of Hobbes' Leviathan. He argues in introductory chapters that the different accounts of human nature given in The Elements of Law, De Corpore, and Leviathan reveal a development parallel to the development in the Hobbesian notion of science. More particularly, he claims that the theory of science presented in Leviathan is a conventionalist one, taking mathematics as its model. This is in contrast to the self-evidence theory of mathematics and the hypothetico-deductive (...) theory of physics found in De Corpore and it is like the conventionalism of Elements. Using the conventionalist model, Hobbes presents in Leviathan, a science of man which is a formal system of moral and political propositions definitionally true and not "purporting to state truths about human nature." The system of propositions remains true whatever the actual nature of human motivation. Applying his thesis to the various parts of the Leviathan, McNeilly finds Hobbes presenting there a generalized theory of the passions from which the egoism of the earlier works cannot be logically deduced, but is merely a "cautious empirical generalization added to the latter," and not necessary to it. He then shows that notions like power, glory, and felicity of the ethics, and the state of nature, natural law, and obligation of the politics, are reformulated in Leviathan as strictly formal concepts and are logically deduced from the theory of the passions. Material concepts, such as self-preservation, are seen to be expressions of Hobbes' private views and not essential to the system. McNeilly's analyses are lucid and perceptive throughout with the exception of his discussion of the nature of science. Here he imposes upon the writings of Hobbes the contemporary meanings and distinctions instead of working within the tradition of the seventeenth century where the distinctions have not yet been made. A good short English bibliography on Hobbes is appended.--M. M. H. (shrink)

These two books are among the most recently published tomes of a projected twenty comprising the first French edition of the Complete Works of Kierkegaard. Such a work represents the life-long dedication of Paul Tisseau, Kierkegaard's principal French translator. Many of Tisseau's translations have already been published in various other places, and it is generally known that he undertook to publish on his own several of the less commercially appealing religious works. After his death in 1964, his daughter completed his (...) work by correcting published and unpublished manuscripts and by translating the few works her father had not been able to do. The present edition was indeed worth waiting for; it is at once an artful translation and an excellent scholarly tool, complete with marginal pagination of the definitive Danish edition, the Drachmann, Heiberg, Lange of 1920-1926, plus location of each separate work in the first and third Danish editions. Jean Brun provides to-the-point introductions containing a wealth of historical material and ample footnotes referring to significant textual variations, subtleties of translation, and related passages in other works. Volume thirteen contains the Edifying Discourses in Various Spirits, Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing, The Lilies and the Birds, and The Gospel of Sufferings; volume eighteen, Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, The Woman that Was a Sinner, The Unchangeableness of God, For Self-Examination, and Judge for Yourselves.--C. M. R. (shrink)

The Modern Library, which used for its 1941 monolingual edition of the combined Pensées and Provincial Letters the Trotter translation of the former work, has chosen for this bilingual edition of the Pensées the artful translation of H. F. Stewart. The work is divided by Stewart into a major Apology and chronologically arranged Adversaria which he considers to lie outside the scope of the original work. Stewart's scholarly introduction surveys both the incredibly confused situation of existing manuscripts and the evolution (...) of Pascal's thought. Stewart has arranged the material in accordance with Pascal's own plan, which was reconstructed by Filleau de la Chaise and by Pascal's nephew the abbé Périer. One could argue, as does Brunschvicg, whose own arrangement reveals a prime consideration of accessibility to the modern reader rather than historical accuracy, that the authority of Filleau de la Chaise and the abbé Périer is indeed questionable. For their reconstruction of the plan was made some eight years after Pascal had announced it in a lecture at Port Royal in 1658. Moreover, this initial arrangement could not take into account modifications made while writing during the last four years of the author's life. Stewart has nevertheless relied on both the Brunschvicg facsimile of the autographed manuscript and the Tourneur reading of the First Copy, and has consulted several editions of the Pensées. The result is certainly the best edition in English of this momentous work. Stewart's translation is superb, reproducing eloquently Pascal's paradoxical, contrapuntal phrases without losing any of his delightfully subtle wit.—C. M. R. (shrink)

A massive series of meticulous clarifications and arguments is marshalled to attempt to refute, first, the doctrine that all relations are "internal", next, the claims that coherence is the sole criterion of the nature of truth, and finally, the theory of degrees of truth and falsity. The author's great familiarity with the literature of the coherence theorists proves almost a drawback: he prefers to cite texts extensively, but must then acknowledge important differences among them. There is little in the way (...) of a constructive alternative theory of truth, but the criticism is formidable.--W. L. M. (shrink)

The author's previous works on Descartes, Malebranche, and other rationalists, as well as her critical editions of the Méditations and De la Recherche de la Vérité have insured the rich documentation and the interpretative density of this little treatise. However, its main feature is not historical erudition because for this author, as for most contemporary first rank French commentators, Descartes is living still in contemporary work through the freshness and renewed relevance of many of his themes. The part of this (...) study devoted to Descartes is centered upon the Méditations though it offers frequent excursions into the methodical works. In many ways it is a scale model of the Méditations, showing the philosophical scope of this inexhaustible metaphysical masterpiece. The second part has chapters on Reason and Method, God, Man and World, and Human Freedom, with an enlightening parallel treatment of these topics in Spinoza, Malebranche, and Leibniz. A useful bibliography and a chronology of the principal works studied complete this compact volume.--A. M. (shrink)

The work of Hegenberg is more than a simple translation into Portuguese of major parts of the body of current work in the philosophy of science. Behind his thorough work of research and compilation, behind the remarkable clarity and succinctness in the exposition of vast amounts of material, lies an expert organization of theories and problems that promises original contributions by the author in some of the areas here surveyed. After a philosophical preamble on belief, science, and philosophy, Hegenberg advances (...) a general analysis of scientific explanation embracing both deductive and probabilistic explanations. In an extensive third part he deals with the attitudes toward determinism in contemporary science, and with particular kinds of explanation such as teleological, psychological, sociological, and historical explanatory structures. Without abandoning the basic thesis of the unity of science, the author shows in this last part a great awareness of the distinct problems posed by explanation in every one of those fields. The bibliographical references after each chapter are rather complete, though references are missing concerning the most recent work in structural linguistics, economics, and anthropology.--A. M. (shrink)

This study is intended as a part of a larger work containing two more monographs, one on interpersonal relations and transcendence in Romano Guardini, the other on Rudolf Bultmann and his critique of metaphysical transcendence. The thought of Buber is traced here to its historical sources in the Jewish tradition but also in Jacobi and Kierkegaard. These two authors are in fact the only ones who attempt to preserve the finitude of the human subject vis-à-vis transcendence at the very beginning (...) and at the end of subjective idealism. Husserl's establishment of a dialectic between ownness and otherness at the heart of the universal flux of consciousness is the next step in Buber's demarcation of his own ontological posture. In Husserl, the encounter with the other within the sphere of otherness is perhaps contingent, i.e., tied to the mysterious passage from the formal dispositions of transcendental consciousness to the material regions and objects that concretely actualize those formal dispositions. In Buber, as in Landgrege's [[sic]] Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, an "intersubjective reduction" must precede the reflective separation of the spheres of ownness and otherness. Indeed without judgment, there is no full reflection in Husserl, but judgment must be understood as dialogical expression before it can be seen as meaningful world orientation. Buber understood well that the source of dialogical expression is silence, yet instead of using silence as the ground of the existential communication that elucidates the boundary situations of man, he gave a beckoning interpretation of silence that must be seen as a precedent of the openness of the horizon of consciousness in Heidegger's Gelassenheit. Though Babolin does not give any indication here of the direction of the forthcoming monographs, the fact that they are about Guardini and Bultmann may indicate that he is moving away from mysticism in the remainder of this work.--A. M. (shrink)

A sequel to a previous work on Croce's philosophy of history, the present volume contains the author's critique of pragmatic historiography. In Croce's own system, art, law, and religion had been originally differentiated along Hegelian lines. The influence of Pareto and of Marxism brought him to the realization of the autonomy of economics. His Filosofia della pratica put side by side all of these categories of action. For Croce the pure freedom that defines moral action, and the responsibility for evil (...) corresponding to the element of negativity in choosing, belong properly in the social realm. Bausola's interesting and timely book follows closely Croce's long struggle with this antinomy in his constant reworking of his analyses of culture.--A. M. (shrink)

This is the first of a two part study on Croce that ought to give a significant turn to current interpretation of this author as well as to current opinion about his value. Bausola leaves for the second part discussion of Croce's vitalism in its variations, and also the ethical and political themes in which the Croce-Marx relation finds expression. This first part deals mostly with logical and ontological themes, all of them connected by Croce's constant struggle against any form (...) of transcendence. One would think that what is dead in Croce is precisely his ontological theory, while his philosophy of praxis, because of its emphasis on freedom, would more likely be alive and full of interesting suggestions for the present. The two fundamental contributions of this work are: the new light that it throws upon Croce's speculations on the concept of "concept," and its "phenomenological" understanding of Croce's distinction between the impossibility of transcending consciousness and the impossibility of objectifying it. Since these interpretations are made in the light of Croce's ideas, Bausola's work has the effect of bringing back the voice of Croce into the present dialogue on the question of immanence and transcendence.--A. M. (shrink)

This is the first part of a two-volume study which may very well represent a turning point of scholarship on Heidegger and a step beyond his position. Paradoxically this work is outstanding both as criticism and as close interpretation of Heidegger. The critical perspectives on Heidegger developed by Regina carry to their natural conclusion some important analyses of the theme of finitude contributed by his colleague, E. Severino, in the mid-sixties. These analyses made clearer the relationship between finitude and the (...) nihilistic tendencies discovered by Heidegger in Western thought. What Heidegger calls metaphysics is the history of the efforts to negate finitude and contingency by ascribing necessity and original worth to one or another ontic property of beings. Heidegger promised on various occasions a destructive history of metaphysics, but his thought in this respect has developed in fragments--on Nietzsche, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Plato, Aristotle, and the Presocratics--which require a considerable work of piecing together. Regina's own thesis on finitude, which parallels the important contributions of Michel Henry, makes these pieces fit in what is possibly the best ensemble yet devised with them. A truly brilliant feature of this interpretation is its emphasis on the role attributed to Kant by Heidegger, a role which places Kant outside Western metaphysics and among the pioneers of theoretical investigation of the ties between finitude and transcendence. The direction in which this first part of Regina's work points is that of a possible refocusing on those aspects of Heidegger's work that revalue human dignity. Such refocusing can have so productive an impact on the unification of philosophical work in Europe that the second part of this study should be anxiously awaited.--A. M. (shrink)

Time has not worn out the urgency and the novelty of these essays on existentialism published first in 1950 and again in 1959. The nothingness on which Paci writes so poignantly here is being as dealt with in the various historico-philosophical positions of transcendence. This suggestion of Paci is Heideggerian in character: being and nothingness are after all identified. But since Paci has in mind the inevitable destruction of human finitude by philosophical conceptions of transcendence, his words of caution apply (...) to Heidegger's intentions as well. Heidegger in fact destroyed metaphysics, i.e., the possibility of enclosing transcendence within any philosophical system. Yet by making this destruction systematic he opened up a new transcendence which encompasses existence as speech oriented in the philosophical mode. For Paci all of these philosophical positions end up identifying being and nothingness precisely because none of their images of transcendence can be properly superimposed upon the freedom and the finitude of man; thus, they become irrelevant, they lead nowhere. Three philosophical directions in Paci's background lead him away from this irrelevancy: the Augustinian emphasis on the existentiell that leads through Kierkegaard to Jaspers; the immanentistic [[sic]] sense of human development that flows parallel in Marx and Croce; the constitutive role of experience and expression in the late Husserl. Concerning the latter, Paci sees some important connections between constitution and myth in the two central chapters of his work, one of which is about existentialism and neo-Kantianism and the other about myth and existence.--A. M. (shrink)